Organized Crime and Economic Growth: Evidence from Municipalities Infiltrated by the Mafia
中文摘要
本文研究解散遭有组织犯罪渗透的市议会所产生的长期经济影响。我们将匹配双重差分设计应用于意大利全部社会保障记录，发现解散市议会（CCDs）提高了就业、企业数量和工业房地产价格。这些效应集中在黑手党主导的行业，以及在任者连任比例较低的市镇。此类解散通过削弱黑手党并增进对地方机构的信任，带来了巨大的经济回报。分析表明，解散市议会是在受有组织犯罪主导地区建立合法性、推动经济活动的一项有效干预措施。（JEL D73, H77, K42, R11, R23）
Abstract
This paper studies the long-run economic impact of dismissing city councils infiltrated by organized crime. Applying a matched difference-in-differences design to the universe of Italian social security records, we find that city council dismissals (CCDs) increase employment, the number of firms, and industrial real estate prices. The effects are concentrated in Mafia-dominated sectors and in municipalities where fewer incumbents are reelected. The dismissals generate large economic returns by weakening the Mafia and fostering trust in local institutions. The analysis suggests that CCDs represent an effective intervention for establishing legitimacy and spurring economic activity in areas dominated by organized crime. (JEL D73, H77, K42, R11, R23)