Opportunity Unraveled: Private Information and the Missing Markets for Financing Human Capital
中文摘要
我们考察逆向选择是否已导致用于高等教育融资的股权合约和状态依存型债务合约私人市场消解。利用有关信念的调查数据，我们表明，为克服股权市场中的逆向选择，典型的大学就读者每获得1美元融资，就必须按现值偿还1.64美元。我们发现，风险厌恶的大学就读者不愿接受这些条款，因此市场消解。我们讨论了为何道德风险、偏差信念和外部信贷选择不太可能解释这些市场的缺失。我们量化了补贴能够缓解大学就读风险的类股权合约所带来的福利收益。（JEL D82, D83, G51, I22, I23, I26, J24）
Abstract
We examine whether adverse selection has unraveled private markets for equity and state-contingent debt contracts for financing higher education. Using survey data on beliefs, we show a typical college-goer would have to repay $1.64 in present value for every $1 of financing to overcome adverse selection in an equity market. We find that risk-averse college-goers are not willing to accept these terms, so markets unravel. We discuss why moral hazard, biased beliefs, and outside credit options are less likely to explain the absence of these markets. We quantify the welfare gains for subsidizing equity-like contracts that mitigate college-going risks. (JEL D82, D83, G51, I22, I23, I26, J24)