Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design
American Economic Review · 2024 · Kyle Greenberg、Parag A. Pathak、Tayfun Sönmez
中文摘要
我们提出了极简主义市场设计（Sönmez 2023）的一个概念验证，将其作为一种有效方法论，能够依据利益相关者的诉求、以最小程度的干预改进制度。自2006年以来，尊重功绩、提高留任率、实现人才匹配和增强信任这四项目标，一直指导着美国陆军将学员集中分配至各军事专业的流程改革。西点军校（USMA）面向2020届学员采用的机制加剧了这些目标在落实过程中面临的挑战。我们将陆军的诉求形式化为严格的公理体系，并分析其含义。按照我们对制度进行极简主义重新设计的方法，陆军的各项目标唯一确定了一种兵种分配机制。我们的设计现已在西点军校（USMA）和后备军官训练团（ROTC）采用。（JEL D47、H56、J45）
Abstract
We present a proof-of-concept for minimalist market design (Sönmez 2023) as an effective methodology to enhance an institution based on stakeholders’ desiderata with minimal interference. Four objectives— respecting merit, increasing retention, aligning talent, and enhancing trust—guided reforms to the US Army’s centralized branching process of cadets to military specialties since 2006. USMA’s mechanism for the class of 2020 exacerbated challenges in implementing these objectives. Formulating the Army’s desiderata as rigorous axioms, we analyze their implications. Under our minimalist approach to institution redesign, the Army’s objectives uniquely identify a branching mechanism. Our design is now adopted at USMA and ROTC. (JEL D47, H56, J45)