器官移植与获取监管：一项市场设计实验室实验

中文摘要

我们开展了一项实验室实验，结果表明，现行监管移植中心（TC）和器官获取组织（OPO）的规则造成了扭曲性激励，导致器官获取和有益移植均出现低效率的减少。我们将这一决策环境建模为OPO与TC之间的双参与者多轮博弈。在模拟现行规则的实验条件下，OPO仅获取质量最高的肾脏，并放弃有价值的获取机会；TC则拒绝部分有益的移植。以整个患者群体的健康结果为依据、对TC和OPO共同给予奖励的替代性监管规则，会促使双方采取增加器官获取和适宜移植的行为。

Abstract

We conduct a lab experiment that shows that current rules regulating transplant centers (TCs) and organ-procurement organizations (OPOs) create perverse incentives that inefficiently reduce both organ recovery and beneficial transplantations. We model the decision environment with a two-player multiround game between an OPO and a TC. In the condition that simulates current rules, OPOs recover only the highest-quality kidneys and forgo valuable recovery opportunities, and TCs decline some beneficial transplants. Alternative regulations that reward TCs and OPOs together for health outcomes in their entire patient pool lead to behaviors that increase organ recovery and appropriate transplants.