天然气陷阱：战胜煤炭还是可再生能源
The Gas Trap: Outcompeting Coal versus Renewables
Journal of Political Economy · 2026 · [{"name": "Bård Harstad", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "Centre for Economic Policy Research"]}, {"name": "Katinka Holtsmark", "affiliation": ["University of Oslo"]}]
中文摘要
我们分析了关注气候的天然气生产者所面临的一个根本性困境与时间不一致问题。短期内，增加产量以在竞争中胜过煤炭具有吸引力。然而，一旦这一政策被预期到，对可再生能源的投资便会下降，排放最终可能不降反升。当天然气生产者无法预先承诺时，其政策可能适得其反。一个应用于欧洲的模拟版本证实，"天然气陷阱"在数量上具有重要性。我们讨论了这一结果的稳健性以及可能的解决方案，其范围从对可再生能源的直接投资，到对天然气搜寻与勘探征税。
Abstract
We analyze a fundamental dilemma and time-inconsistency problem facing climate-concerned producers of natural gas. In the short term, it is tempting to produce more to outcompete coal. When this policy is anticipated, however, investments in renewables fall and emissions may ultimately increase. When the gas producers cannot precommit, their policies can be counterproductive. A simulated version applied to Europe verifies that the gas trap is quantitatively important. We discuss the robustness of this result and possible solutions, ranging from direct investments in renewables to taxes on the search and exploration of gas.