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不幸与失误:高成本贷款借款人的财务状况与决策能力

Misfortune and Mistake: The Financial Conditions and Decision-Making Ability of High-Cost Loan Borrowers
Journal of Political Economy · 2024 · Leandro Carvalho、Arna Olafsson、Dan Silverman

中文摘要

许多高成本贷款监管政策的适当性,取决于贷款需求是由财务状况(“不幸”)驱动,还是由不完美决策(“失误”)驱动。冰岛的银行记录显示,借款人在获得贷款前不久流动性尤其低。在关联的选择实验中,借款人表现出较低的决策能力(DMA):45% 的贷款资金流向了 DMA 分布最低的 20% 人群。需求的标准决定因素无法解释这一关系,这一关系也反映在 DMA 与一个明确的“失误”之间的关系中。因此,“不幸”与“失误”似乎都在驱动需求。

Abstract

The appropriateness of many high-cost loan regulations depends on whether demand is driven by financial conditions ("misfortunes") or imperfect decisions ("mistakes"). Bank records from Iceland show borrowers have especially low liquidity just before getting a loan. Borrowers exhibit lower decision-making ability (DMA) in linked choice experiments: 45% of loan dollars go to the bottom 20% of the DMA distribution. Standard determinants of demand do not explain this relationship, which is also mirrored by the relationship between DMA and an unambiguous "mistake." Both "misfortune" and "mistake" thus appear to drive demand.
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