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逃税与资本课税

Tax Evasion and Capital Taxation
Journal of Political Economy · 2024 · Shahar Rotberg、Joseph B. Steinberg

中文摘要

财富不平等引发了提高资本收入和财富税税率的呼声,但也令人担忧富裕家庭会通过将资产隐匿于海外来应对。我们运用一般均衡模型,研究加重资本税负将如何影响海外逃税,以及这将如何波及更广泛的经济。在不存在逃税的情况下,税收收入可以大幅增加,不平等程度可以降低,并可实现广泛的福利增益。然而,在考虑逃税后,税收收入仅会小幅上升甚至下降,不平等程度将加剧,并会造成广泛的福利损失。

Abstract

Wealth inequality has prompted calls for higher taxes on capital income and wealth but also concerns that rich households would respond by concealing their assets offshore. We use a general equilibrium model to study how taxing capital more heavily would affect offshore tax evasion and how this would affect the broader economy. Without evasion, tax revenue could be increased dramatically, inequality could be reduced, and widespread welfare gains could be achieved. After accounting for evasion, however, tax revenue would rise marginally or even fall, inequality would increase, and widespread welfare losses would result.
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