Guaranteed Employment in Rural India: Intra-Household Labor and Resource Allocation Consequences
中文摘要
本文研究针对印度农村家庭的就业保障政策对家庭内部劳动与资源配置的影响。该保障为家庭收入提供保险，替代了女性作为“附加劳动者”的角色，并消除了储蓄的一个动机。尽管项目岗位的参与规模相当可观，该保障仍减少了对其他工作活动的参与，从而降低了已婚女性的劳动参与率，并减少了其丈夫的总工作时长。该保障至多可解释近期全国范围内农村女性劳动参与率下降中的30%。尽管就业保障增加了家庭消费，但它削弱了女性对家庭收入的支配能力，进而损害了她们的福祉。(JEL D13, G51, I32, J16, J22, J68, O12)
Abstract
I investigate the intrahousehold labor and resource allocation consequences of an employment guarantee targeting rural households in India. The guarantee insures household earnings, replacing women as added workers and shutting down a motive for saving. Despite sizable program-job take-up, the guarantee decreases participation in other working activities and, thus, labor force participation of married women and total time worked by their husbands. The guarantee accounts for up to 30 percent of a recent countrywide decrease in rural female labor force participation. Though it increases household consumption, the guarantee reduces the command of women’s household earnings and, thereby, their well-being. (JEL D13, G51, I32, J16, J22, J68, O12)