中文摘要
政治关联如何影响企业动态、创新和创造性破坏？我们扩展了熊彼特增长模型，引入有助于企业减轻官僚和监管负担的政治关联。该模型突出了政治关联如何影响一个经济体的商业活力和创新，并推导出若干用于指导实证分析的含义。我们构建了一个覆盖1993—2014年全部企业、工人和政治家的新大规模数据集，并辅以企业财务报表、专利数据和选举数据，据此将雇用当地政治家的企业界定为政治关联企业。我们发现了一个领导者悖论：市场领导者拥有政治关联的可能性高得多，但进行创新的可能性却低得多。政治关联与更高的存续率以及就业和营收增长相关，但与生产率增长无关——我们还采用断点回归设计证实了这一结果。在总体层面，政治关联带来的收益不足以抵消资源再配置减少和增长放缓所造成的损失。
Abstract
How do political connections affect firm dynamics, innovation, and creative destruction? We extend a Schumpeterian growth model with political connections that help firms ease bureaucratic and regulatory burden. The model highlights how political connections influence an economy's business dynamism and innovation, and generates a number of implications guiding our empirical analysis. We construct a new large‐scale data set for the period 1993–2014, on the universe of firms, workers, and politicians, complemented with corporate financial statements, patent data, and election data, so as to define connected firms as those employing local politicians. We identify a leadership paradox: market leaders are much more likely to be politically connected, but much less likely to innovate. Political connections relate to a higher rate of survival, as well as growth in employment and revenues, but not in productivity—a result that we also confirm using the regression discontinuity design. At the aggregate level, gains from political connections do not offset losses stemming from lower reallocation and growth.