中文摘要
本文从实证和理论两方面研究企业游说的经济与金融后果。企业游说政治人物以提高其在政府合同中的份额，但政治竞争会产生企业层面的风险，推高企业的资本成本，并削弱其投资于研究与开发（R&D）的激励。本文发现，高游说企业的股票具有每年6%—8%的回报溢价，这是对投资者承担政治风险的补偿。在一个企业可以开展游说和创新且投资者具有风险厌恶的估计模型中，模型复现了美国企业游说的关键特征，包括一个已得到充分确认的悖论：相较于利益攸关的政策，游说捐款规模很小。模型预测，如果投资者不再寻求政治风险补偿，R&D投资将增加6%，创新率将提高0.4个百分点。即使“浪费”在游说上的资源在客观上很少，游说的风险溢价成本在数量上和经济意义上仍然十分重要。
Abstract
Abstract I study, both empirically and theoretically, the economic and financial consequences of corporate lobbying. Firms lobby politicians to increase their share of government contracts, but political competition creates firm-level risk, inflating their cost of capital and reducing their incentive to invest in research and development (R&D). I document an annual 6–8% return premium for stocks of high-lobbying firms, which compensates investors for political risk. An estimated model in which firms can lobby and innovate and investors are risk averse replicates key features of corporate lobbying in the U.S., including the well-established paradox that lobbying contributions are small relative to the policies at stake. The model predicts that if investors ceased seeking compensation for political risk, R&D investment would increase by 6% and the innovation rate by 0.4% points. The risk-premium costs of lobbying are quantitatively and economically important even if the resources “wasted” on lobbying are objectively small.