Journal of Public Economics · 2025 · Christine T. Bangum、Benny Geys、Rune J. Sørensen
中文摘要
为什么人们会在大规模选举中投票？旨在解释这一投票悖论的理论论证往往强调个人的亲社会动机，这种动机使投票参与决策对成为关键一票的概率不那么敏感。我们利用覆盖挪威全体人口的登记数据，借助跨市人口流动造成的人口规模冲击，并以个人慈善捐赠作为亲社会动机的代理变量，对这一论点进行检验。我们发现，选民规模扩大会拉大亲社会程度较高与较低个体之间的投票参与差距，且亲社会个体的投票参与对人口规模冲击的反应较弱。模拟得到的市级关键一票概率表明，影响选举结果的（预期）概率是这些发现背后的驱动力。• 理论表明，亲社会动机可以解释大规模选举中的投票悖论。• 我们利用跨市人口流动来识别个体层面的选民规模冲击，以检验这一论点。• 个人慈善捐赠作为亲社会动机的代理变量。• 我们发现，亲社会选民与自利选民之间的投票参与差距随选民规模扩大而扩大。• 模拟结果表明，影响选举的概率是这些发现背后的驱动力。
Abstract
Why do people vote in large elections? Theoretical arguments to resolve this paradox of voting often emphasize individuals’ pro-social motivations, which make turnout decisions less sensitive to the pivot probability. Using Norwegian population-wide register data, we test this argument by leveraging population-size shocks from inter-municipal mobility and proxying pro-social motivations via individuals’ charitable donations. We find that increasing electorate size widens the turnout gap between more/less pro-social individuals, and that turnout of pro-social individuals responds less to population-size shocks. Simulated municipality-level pivot probabilities suggest the (expected) probability of influencing election outcomes as a driving force behind these findings. • Theory suggests pro-social motives can resolve the paradox of voting in large-scale elections. • We test this argument using inter-municipal mobility to identify individual-level electorate size shocks. • Individuals’ charitable donations proxy pro-social motivations. • We find that the turnout gap between pro-social and self-interested voters widens with electorate size. • Simulations suggest the probability of influencing the election as a driving force behind these findings.