The effects of extortion and security device adoption on entrepreneurial entry and exit: Evidence from Guatemala
中文摘要
本文利用一家在危地马拉食品零售业经营的跨国公司旗下特许经营门店的调查数据和行政记录，记录了低收入微型创业者遭受勒索的典型经验事实，以及安防摄像头的保护作用。勒索抑制市场进入、增加市场退出并削弱经济竞争。安防摄像头减少市场退出并改善竞争。为解释这些发现，我们提出了一个标准的行业动态模型，其中将勒索纳入为销售税，并将安防设备纳入为一种成本高昂但能降低受害概率的投资。我们对该模型进行结构估计，以开展反事实政策模拟，并比较安防摄像头与其他安防设备的有效性。• 当地勒索率与低收入创业者进入市场呈负相关，与市场退出和经济集中度呈正相关。• 安装安防摄像头提高了企业存续概率，并降低了经济集中度。• 安防摄像头通过降低创业者感知的勒索概率发挥作用，这体现为创业者下午营业时间的延长。• 将勒索纳入行业动态均衡模型后发现，与所有其他反事实安防设备相比，安防摄像头的有效性处于中等水平。
Abstract
Using survey data and administrative records from franchise stores of a multinational company operating in Guatemala’s food retail sector, we document stylized empirical facts about extortion of low-income microentrepreneurs and the protective impact of security cameras. Extortion curtails market entry, increases exit, and lowers economic competition. Security cameras reduce exit and improve competition. To rationalize these findings, we propose a standard model of industry dynamics in which we incorporate extortion as a sales tax and security devices as a costly investment that lowers the probability of victimization. We structurally estimate the model to conduct counterfactual policy simulations and compare the effectiveness of security cameras with that of alternative security devices. • Local extortion rates correlate negatively with the entry of low-income entrepreneurs into the market and positively with market exit and economic concentration. • The installation of security cameras increases the probability of enterprise survival and reduces economic concentration. • Security cameras work by reducing entrepreneurs’ perceived probability of extortion, as reflected by an expansion in afternoon entrepreneurial hours of operation. • Incorporating extortion into an equilibrium model of industry dynamics shows that security cameras fall in the middle of the effectiveness range compared to all other counterfactual security devices.