Private response to exclusionary welfare policy: Evidence from Italian municipalities
中文摘要
排斥性福利政策是极右翼经济议程中的标志性主张之一。然而，关于此类政党掌权后是否确实削减面向移民的福利供给，实证证据仍然有限。本文使用超过600万份采购合同的数据，采用势均力敌选举的断点回归设计进行估计，发现获得极右翼支持的意大利市长显著削减了面向移民和难民的福利支出。然而，利用关于志愿服务协会的新数据，本文还表明，极右翼联盟以微弱优势获胜后，当地非政府组织的人均数量增长了9.6%。这一效应由社会福利协会所驱动，这些协会提供贫困救济以及对弱势群体的援助。个体层面的调查数据表明，志愿服务的增长由对移民持积极态度的左翼倾向公民所推动。这些发现表明，在政治权力更替后，非营利部门可以在提供不属于现任政策制定者议程的公共品方面替代政府。
Abstract
Exclusionary welfare policies are among the flagship proposals in the economic agenda of the far right. Yet, there is little empirical evidence as to whether – after gaining power – such parties do indeed cut welfare provisions for immigrants. Using data on more than 6 million procurement contracts within a close-election Regression Discontinuity Design, I estimate that Italian mayors supported by the far right significantly cut welfare spending for immigrants and refugees. However, using novel data on volunteering associations, I also show that the narrow victory of a far-right coalition is followed by a 9.6 % growth in the per-capita number of local NGOs. The effect is driven by social welfare associations, which provide poverty relief and assistance to vulnerable individuals. Individual-level survey data document how the growth in volunteering is driven by left-leaning citizens with positive attitudes toward immigrants. These findings show how – following political turnovers – the non-profit sector can substitute the state in the provision of public goods that are off the agenda of incumbent policymakers.