The value of group purchasing: Evidence from the U.S. hospital industry
中文摘要
集团采购组织(GPO)广泛存在于许多领域,但其实际价值始终是争论不休的话题。我们开展了较早考察GPO对美国医院物资支出影响的研究之一。我们的双向固定效应模型显示,GPO规模(以成员医院床位容量加权计算的GPO市场份额)增加一个标准差,会使平均每家医院的物资支出降低2.7%,相当于每次出院节省48美元、每年节省约72万美元。我们利用两家最大GPO之间的一次合并事件开展的事件研究得出了性质相似的结果。同时,我们没有发现GPO以牺牲医疗服务质量或选择性收治患者为代价降低物资支出的证据。相反,我们发现部分成本节约以降低医院价格的形式传递给了消费者,但这种情况仅存在于竞争激烈的医院市场。我们的结果直接为有关GPO价值的政策争论提供了依据,并从更广泛的层面为抗衡性买方力量和采购中介相关文献作出了贡献。
Abstract
Group purchasing organizations, or GPOs, are pervasive in many settings, but the actual value of GPOs remains a constant topic of debate. We offer one of the first studies examining the effect of GPOs on supply expenses in the U.S. hospital setting. Our two-way fixed effects model reveals that a one-standard-deviation increase in GPO scale (a GPO’s market share weighted by its member hospitals’ bed capacity) reduces an average hospital’s supply expenses by 2.7%, translating into a per-discharge savings of $48 and an annual savings of about $0.72 million. Our event study, which exploits a merger event between two of the largest GPOs, has produced qualitatively similar results. Meanwhile, we find no evidence that GPOs reduce supply expenses at the cost of the quality of care, nor by means of selective patient admission. Instead, we find that some of the cost savings are passed along to consumers in terms of lowered hospital prices, although only in highly competitive hospital markets. Our results contribute directly to policy debates over the value of GPOs and, more broadly, to the literature on countervailing buyer power and purchasing intermediaries.