Do mandatory disclosures squeeze the lemons? The case of housing markets in India
Journal of Public Economics · 2025 · Vaidehi Tandel、Sahil Gandhi、Anupam Nanda、Nandini Agnihotri
中文摘要
强制披露质量信息会对市场结果产生什么影响？由于购房者私下消除信息不对称的能力存在差异，这种影响是否因收入群体而异？我们在印度住房市场的背景下回答这些问题。在该市场中，购房者与开发商之间的信息不对称程度较高，针对住房项目的诉讼也较为常见。我们发现，2017年一项强制开发商公开诉讼详情的改革，使涉诉住房单元（“柠檬”）的价格下降了4%—6%。收入最低四分位数的购房者所购涉诉单元价格降幅最大，而收入最高四分位数购房者的价格则未受影响。我们的结果表明，高收入购房者拥有关于诉讼的私人信息，而低收入购房者不具备这些信息。我们还发现，改革后涉诉项目中售出单元的占比有所下降，这可能促使开发商降低价格。我们的研究为发展中国家通过披露法减少市场低效率和信息获取不平等提供了支持。
Abstract
What is the impact of mandatory disclosures of quality on market outcomes? Does the impact differ across income groups due to a difference in abilities of buyers to privately resolve information asymmetry? We answer these questions in the context of housing markets in India, where information asymmetry between homebuyers and developers is high and litigation against housing projects is common. We find that a 2017 reform mandating developers to make litigation details public led to a 4 %–6 % decline in prices of litigated housing units (lemons). Litigated units purchased by buyers in the lowest income quartile saw the greatest decline in prices while prices for buyers in the highest income quartile were unaffected. Our results suggest that high-income buyers had private information on litigation, which low-income buyers did not have. We find that the share of units sold in litigated projects declined after the reform, which may be driving developers to reduce prices. We provide support for disclosure laws in developing countries to reduce market inefficiencies and unequal access to information.