Journal of Public Economics · 2025 · Adam Bloomfield、Lucas Goodman、M Govinda Rao、Sita Slavov
中文摘要
近年来，美国部分州为促进退休储蓄，陆续采取了“自动个人退休账户（auto-IRA）”政策，要求目前尚未提供雇主发起型退休计划（ESRP）的雇主选择以下一种方式：（1）设立ESRP；或（2）将雇员纳入州政府协助设立的个人退休账户（IRA）。我们利用这些政策处理在各州及不同雇主规模类别中的分阶段推行，识别州级政策对企业是否提供ESRP这一决策的影响。基于美国税收微观数据，我们估计，这些政策促使约17%的受处理企业被诱导提供ESRP，不过其效应因企业和劳动者特征而存在显著异质性。鉴于对雇主而言，设立和维持ESRP的成本高于使用州政府协助设立的IRA，这一效应是相当大的。我们从理性和行为两方面探讨了企业为何可能选择成本更高的方式来遵守州级自动IRA政策。
Abstract
Several states have recently attempted to boost retirement saving by adopting “auto-IRA” policies that require employers not currently offering an employer-sponsored retirement plan (ESRP) to either (1) establish an ESRP or (2) enroll employees in state-facilitated Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). We identify the effect of these state policies on firm decisions to offer ESRPs, exploiting the phased rollout of these policy treatments across states and employer size categories. Using U.S. tax microdata, we estimate that about 17% of treated firms have been induced to offer an ESRP by these policies, although there is substantial heterogeneity in these effects across firm and worker characteristics. This effect is large considering that, for employers, establishing and maintaining an ESRP is more costly than utilizing the state-facilitated IRAs. We explore both rational and behavioral explanations for why firms might choose the higher-cost option to comply with state auto-IRA policies.