Can changes in disability insurance work incentives influence beneficiary employment? Evidence from the promoting opportunity demonstration
Journal of Public Economics · 2025 · Michael Levere、David Wittenburg、John T. Jones
中文摘要
我们研究残障福利受益人的工作行为如何响应一项规则变化：该变化将“现金悬崖”——收入超过某一门槛后福利降至零——替换为“福利抵减斜坡”——福利逐步退出。我们利用一项随机对照试验进行研究，试验对象为自愿参加该示范项目的逾10,000名社会保障残障保险受益人；结果显示，该规则变化对劳动收入、总收入和福利金额的影响均为精确估计的零效应。机制分析表明，行政负担、激励幅度有限，以及残障人士就业所面临的个人和制度性障碍，可能共同导致了影响有限。
Abstract
We study how disability beneficiary work behavior responds to a rule change that replaces a cash cliff—a threshold above which benefits reduce to zero—with a benefit offset ramp—where benefits are gradually phased out. Using a randomized controlled trial with over 10,000 Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries who voluntarily enrolled in the demonstration, we find precisely estimated null effects on earnings, income, and benefit amounts. An analysis of mechanisms indicates that administrative burden, the limited size of the incentive, and individual and systemic barriers to employment for people with disabilities likely contributed to the limited impacts.