金融稳定理论遭遇现实：银行监管与会计裁量权的统一框架

中文摘要

经济学与金融学交叉领域的大量文献为通过监管银行以提高金融稳定性提供了政策建议。该文献抽象掉了会计准则赋予银行在财务报告方面的自由裁量权，从而在最优监管模型所假设的监管者可获得的信息与现实中监管者实际可获得的信息之间形成了缺口。我们融合经济学、金融学和会计学文献的见解，综合有关银行监管设计与实施的知识，并识别出有待进一步研究的领域。我们提出一个简单的框架来梳理相关思想，即：促使银行监管的外部性、允许会计自由裁量权的理由，以及利用自由裁量权规避监管。我们对这些领域研究的回顾表明，关于银行监管与会计自由裁量权的学术研究需要采用更为统一的方法，才能为现实世界设计出最优政策。

Abstract

A large literature at the intersection of economics and finance offers prescriptions for regulating banks to increase financial stability.This literature abstracts from the discretion that accounting standards give banks over financial reporting, creating a gap between the information assumed to be available to regulators in models of optimal regulation and the information available to regulators in reality.We bridge insights from the economics, finance, and accounting literatures to synthesize knowledge about the design and implementation of bank regulation and identify areas where more work is needed.We present a simple framework for organizing the relevant ideas, namely the externalities that motivate bank regulation, the rationales for allowing accounting discretion, and the use of discretion to circumvent regulation.Our takeaway from reviewing work in these areas is that academic studies of bank regulation and accounting discretion require a more unified approach to design optimal policy for the real world.