中文摘要
我们考察政策咨询市场中专家之间的伯特兰竞争。政策制定者既可以聘用一名专家，也可以自行作出政策决策。专家在政策能力和偏好方面存在差异，并且既可能收取费用，也可能提供游说捐款。均衡状态下，如果受聘专家具有较高的政策能力，且双方的政策偏好大致一致，她就会收取费用。否则，该专家会支付捐款，因而不再充当顾问，而是充当游说者。比较静态分析表明，更激烈的竞争甚至可能促使一名此前以正价格受聘的专家转而从事游说。最后，我们将该模型应用于动机不同的专家之间的竞争，反映了当前关于专业顾问在政府咨询中所发挥作用的争论。我们表明，如果政策议题范围狭窄，且主要涉及政策制定者本人的选民，那么有能力的顾问的存在可能会降低社会福利。我们的结果为政治活动中资金为何如此之少这一经验谜题提供了其他解释。
Abstract
We investigate Bertrand competition between experts in a policy-advising market. A policy-maker can either hire one of the experts or take the policy decision himself. The experts differ in policy competence and preferences and may either charge a fee or offer lobbying contributions. In equilibrium, the hired expert charges a fee if she has high policy competence and policy preferences are roughly aligned. Otherwise, the expert pays contributions—and thus acts as a lobbyist instead of as an advisor. Comparative statics show that more intense competition may even cause an expert previously hired at a positive price to engage in lobbying. Finally, we apply the model to competition between experts with different motives, reflecting the current debate about the role of professional consultants in advising governments. We show that the presence of able consultants may decrease social welfare if the policy issue is narrow and mainly concerns the policy-maker’s own voters. Our results give rise to alternative explanations for the empirical puzzle of why there is so little money in politics.