Property taxation as compensation for local externalities: Evidence from large plants
中文摘要
大型工业工厂往往会创造广泛的经济收益，但也会对附近居民造成损害。当地方辖区拥有土地使用控制权时，若缺乏充分补偿，此类工厂可能不会建成。本文研究大型工厂缴纳的财产税在多大程度上补偿了地方损害，以及地方政府在制定当地工业发展决策时是否将这些财政收益内部化。我们首先证明，工厂开设对税基的影响在经济意义上很大，会导致地方支出增加和地方财产税税率下降，并且受到当地居民的重视。随后，我们提供了提示性证据，表明限制地方辖区获取财产税会降低其辖区内设有大型工业工厂的可能性。综合来看，这些结果表明，地方税基的扩大是产生较大外部性的项目所带来的一项重要收益，受到居民重视；地方政府在制定发展决策时可能会将这些工厂的财政影响内部化。
Abstract
Large scale industrial plants often create broad economic benefits, but impose harms on nearby residents. When local jurisdictions have control over land use, such plants may not be built absent sufficient compensation. In this paper, we study the extent to which large plants’ property tax payments compensate for local harms and whether local governments internalize these fiscal benefits when making decisions about local industrial development. We first demonstrate that the tax base impact of plant openings are economically large, lead to increases in local expenditures and reductions in local property tax rates, and are valued by local residents. We next show suggestive evidence that limiting local jurisdictions’ access to property taxation reduces the likelihood that they will contain large industrial plants. Together, these results suggest that increases in the local tax base are an important benefit of large externality-producing projects that are valued by residents and that local governments may internalize the fiscal impact of these plants when making development decisions.