Campaign contributions and legislative behavior: Evidence from U.S. Congress
中文摘要
竞选捐款与民选代表的立法行为之间存在何种关系？本文发现，捐款越集中，与国会议员三类成本较高的立法活动呈负相关：提出法案、在国会发言以及作为证人出席委员会听证会。就提出法案而言，这种负相关在与再分配有关的议题（例如医疗和社会福利法案）上更强。为解释这些结果，我认为，更为偏斜的捐款结构使国会议员更加依赖其主要捐款人，因而可能更倾向于代表后者的利益。联邦立法者可能出于回报捐款人的人情、争取其持续提供资金支持，或仅仅因为感到资金保障稳固而享有更多闲暇时间等原因，在与国会议程和公共政策相关的活动中表现得不那么积极。总体而言，我认为，竞选捐款扭曲了民选代表在国会中配置立法努力的激励。• 捐款结构越偏斜的立法者，在国会中的活动越少。• 立法产出与对大额捐款的依赖呈负相关。• 竞选捐款扭曲了立法者配置努力的激励。
Abstract
What is the relationship between campaign contributions and legislative behavior of elected representatives? In this paper, I find that more concentrated donations negatively correlate with three costly legislative endeavors of members of Congress: bill sponsorship, speechmaking on the floor and witness appearances before committees. For bill sponsorship, the negative correlation is stronger for topics related to redistribution, such as health and social welfare bills. To interpret these results, I argue that a more skewed structure of contributions makes members of Congress more dependent on their top donors and thus potentially more inclined to represent their interests. By reciprocating favors to donors, by seeking to secure their continued financial support, or simply by enjoying more leisure time as a result of feeling secure in their financial backing, federal legislators are less active in activities related to the Congressional agenda and public policy. Overall, I contend that campaign contributions distort the incentives of elected representatives to allocate legislative effort in Congress. • Legislators with more skewed structure of donations do less in Congress. • Legislative production is negatively correlated with reliance on big donations. • Campaign contributions distort the incentives of legislators to allocate effort.