Journal of Public Economics · 2025 · Jennifer Buurma-Olsen、Hans R.A. Kost、Jos van Ommeren、J.S. Sinninghe Damsté
Abstract
We empirically investigate how rent control combined with the use of a non-market allocation mechanism – centralised waiting lists – affects the efficiency of housing allocation among public-housing tenants. We show that, on average, Dutch public-housing tenants consume a house whose value differs by 7.5% from what they would consume under an efficient allocation. This entails particularly large transfers in housing consumption from younger households to older households. The annual welfare loss arising from misallocation within the public-housing sector is modest, estimated at around €65 per tenant. • The study examines the impact of rent control and waiting lists on allocation efficiency among Dutch public housing tenants. • Public tenants consume a house whose value differs by 7.5% from what they would consume under efficient allocation. • Annual welfare loss per tenant arising from misallocation is modest, estimated at around €65.