Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities
中文摘要
本文利用法国数据，同时估计两类关联对分配给市镇的政府补贴的影响。在同一背景下考察不同类型的关联，有助于区分可能驱动“猪肉桶”政治（政治分肥）的不同动机。我们区分了两类市镇：部长在被任命进入政府前曾任职（如任市长）的市镇，以及其童年时期居住过的市镇。利用部长进入和退出政府的时点变动，我们发现，当与某市镇有关联的政治家进入政府时，该部长曾任市长的市镇获得的投资补贴增加30%；而当该部长离任时，补贴则出现幅度相近的下降。相比之下，我们未在部长童年时期居住过的市镇观察到这些结果。这些发现表明，对童年朋友和家人的利他主义并未助长政治分肥，并提示对成年后社会关系的利他主义或职业关切才是重要因素。我们还提供了补充证据，表明所观察到的政治分肥源于部长的非正式（软性）影响，而非其对所领导行政机构的正式控制。
• 我们估计了两类关联对法国市镇补贴的影响。
• 我们区分了部长曾任职的市镇与其成长地所在的市镇。
• 有部长曾任市长的市镇，在该部长入阁时获得补贴，在其离任时补贴减少。
• 对于部长童年时期成长的市镇，我们未观察到类似结果。
• 研究结果表明，职业关切或成年期社会关系驱动了补贴，而非童年纽带。
Abstract
This paper uses French data to simultaneously estimate the impact of two types of connections on government subsidies allocated to municipalities. Investigating different types of connection in a same setting helps to distinguish between the different motivations that could drive pork-barreling. We differentiate between municipalities where ministers held office before their appointment to the government and those where they lived as children. Exploiting ministers’ entries into and exits from the government, we show that municipalities where a minister was mayor receive 30% more investment subsidies when the politician they are linked to joins the government, and a similar size decrease when the minister departs. In contrast, we do not observe these outcomes for municipalities where ministers lived as children. These findings indicate that altruism toward childhood friends and family does not fuel pork-barreling, and suggest that altruism toward adulthood social relations or career concerns matter. We also present complementary evidence suggesting that observed pork-barreling is the result of soft influence of ministers, rather than of their formal control over the administration they lead. • We estimate the impact of two connection types on subsidies to French municipalities. • We distinguish municipalities where ministers served from where they grew up. • Municipalities with minister-mayors gain subsidies when they join, lose when they leave. • We see no similar outcomes for municipalities where ministers grew up as children. • Findings suggest career concerns or adult relations drive subsidies, not childhood ties.