拉弗曲线对簿公堂：刑事司法费用与罚金的财政收入效应

中文摘要

许多司法辖区对刑事被告征收数额可观的罚金和费用（法律财务义务，简称LFO）。支持者认为，LFO是一种为法院提供资金并发挥威慑作用的“犯罪税”；反对者则认为，它既不能为法院筹资，也无法产生威慑。我们考察降低LFO的财政影响。违约激励会形成一条“拉弗”曲线，即财政收入最终会随LFO的提高而下降。然而，利用详细的行政数据，我们发现，能够明确判定处于曲线右侧的被告寥寥无几。这些被告往往较为贫困、是黑人，并被控犯有重罪。因此，降低普通被告的LFO将给政府带来相当大的成本。

Abstract

Many jurisdictions levy sizable fines and fees (legal financial obligations, or LFOs) on criminal defendants. Proponents argue LFOs are a “tax on crime” that funds courts and provides deterrence; opponents argue they do neither. We examine the fiscal implications of lowering LFOs. Incentives to default generate a “Laffer” curve with revenue eventually decreasing in LFOs. Using detailed administrative data, however, we find few defendants demonstrably on the right-hand side of the curve. Those who are tend to be poor, Black, and charged with felonies. As a result, decreasing LFOs for the average defendant would come at substantial cost to governments.