谁真正承担（银行）税负？仅改变法定归宿的证据

中文摘要

我们利用以下条件分析仅改变税收法定归宿的影响：（i）抵押贷款税的征收对象从借款人转为银行，但税率不变；（ii）部分地区因历史原因享有免税待遇（或适用不同税率）；以及（iii）行政数据。转移发生后，平均抵押贷款利率上升，但对拥有更多银行选择机会或收入更高的家庭，利率上升幅度较小。税负转嫁对高收入家庭而言并不存在，但对低收入家庭而言则是完全转嫁。与此一致，银行的风险承担有所增加，受政策影响更大的银行尤为明显。结果与如下模型一致：所有借款人均存在税收显著性问题，但其相对于贷款人的议价能力存在差异。总体而言，这些证据与法定归宿无关论不符，并表明该政策会对不平等和银行风险承担产生非预期后果。

Abstract

We analyze the effects of only shifting the statutory incidence of taxes by exploiting: (i) a mortgage tax shift from being levied on borrowers to being levied on banks, without tax rate changes; (ii) some areas –for historical reasons– being tax-exempt (or having different tax rates); and (iii) administrative data. After the shift, the average mortgage rate increases, less for households with more banking opportunities or with higher income. The tax pass-through is nonexistent for high-income households, but complete for low-income households. Consistently, banks’ risk-taking increases, especially by more policy-affected banks. Results are consistent with a model in which all borrowers have tax saliency issues and differ in their bargaining power vis-à-vis the lender. Overall, the evidence is inconsistent with the irrelevance of statutory incidence and suggests unintended consequences on inequality and banks’ risk-taking.