中文摘要
我在一个包含随机人力资本积累与不完全市场、内生劳动供给以及被建模为实物期权的教育选择的模型中，探讨最优教育补贴与劳动税累进程度；在该模型中，行为人在开始工作前选择最优的受教育年限。在一个纯分析性的基准模型中，学生面临严格的借贷约束，从而形成没有储蓄的无交易均衡；政府通过向学生提供转移支付，或等价地通过向大学提供拨款，来支付教育费用。社会福利最大化政策包含慷慨的教育补贴和高度累进的劳动税，其程度远高于美国或欧洲目前的水平，并带来平均8%的消费等价收益。这一结果在多种扩展设定下均保持稳健，其中包括一个放松金融摩擦的定量模型；在该模型中，学生可以通过借款为教育融资，因此均衡表现为劳动者进行广泛的预防性储蓄。
Abstract
I explore optimal education subsidies and progressivity of labour taxes in a model with stochastic human capital accumulation and incomplete markets, endogenous labour supply and an education choice modelled as a real option , where agents choose an optimal number of years to study before starting work. In a purely analytical Baseline model with tight borrowing constraints on students, which leads to a no-trade equilibrium without savings, the government pays for education via transfers to students or – equivalently – via grants to universities. The social welfare-maximising policy features generous education subsidies and highly progressive labour taxes, much more so than currently seen in the US or Europe, and results in an average consumption-equivalent gain of 8%. This result is robust to myriad extensions, including a Quantitative model with relaxed financial frictions where students can borrow to finance their education, and where hence the equilibrium features extensive precautionary saving by workers.