监督对政治家出席率的影响：来自瑞士联邦院的证据

中文摘要

2014年，瑞士联邦院将举手表决改为电子投票系统，在该系统下，针对特定外生界定的表决类型，议员个人的表决决定会自动公布。我们利用部分表决中监督技术的这一升级，在准实验双重差分方法框架下识别监督对政治家出席率的影响。依据瑞士联邦院第49届立法期（2011—2015年）所有会议的录像，我们确定了改革前后所有表决期间的出席率，并比较受改革影响与不受改革影响的表决之间出席率的变化。监督对出席率具有正向且显著的影响，对寻求连任的议员尤为如此，与任期结束后退休的议员相比更是这样。• 一项强化监督的改革提高了瑞士联邦院的出席率。• 强化监督使公开表决期间的缺席减少了14%。• 表决结构和选举压力会影响出席率。• 监督提高了出席率，对寻求连任的议员尤其如此。• 与独立表决相比，按投票阵营进行的表决中出席率上升更多。

Abstract

In 2014, the Swiss Upper House switched from voting by show of hands to an electronic voting system, where individual decisions on specific exogenously defined vote types are published automatically. We leverage this update in monitoring technology for select votes to identify the impact of monitoring on politicians’ attendance within a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences methodology. Relying on video recordings of all sessions of the 49th Upper House legislature (2011–2015), we determine pre- and post-reform attendance rates during all votes and compare the change in attendance between votes affected and unaffected by the reform. Monitoring has a positive and significant effect on attendance particularly among legislators running for reelection, as compared to those retiring at the end of the term. • Attendance in the Swiss Upper House increased due to a reform enhancing monitoring. • Enhanced monitoring led to a 14% reduction in absences during public votes. • Vote structure and electoral pressures influence attendance. • Monitoring improved attendance, especially for legislators seeking reelection. • Attendance rose more in voting blocs than in independent votes.