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减轻冲击:疫情期间的就业保留计划

Softening the blow: Job retention schemes in the pandemic
Journal of Public Economics · 2024 · Jolan Mohimont、Maite de Sola Perea、Marie-Denise Zachary

中文摘要

我们在一个依据欧元区数据校准、具有不完全保险和异质性主体的动态随机一般均衡(DSGE)模型中,评估为应对新冠疫情而实施的临时就业保留计划(JRS)的福利效应。当就业保留计划精准针对可能具有存续能力但面临流失风险的岗位时,会产生巨大的正向福利效应,并使所有家庭受益。这些福利增益对于流动资产匮乏的家庭尤为显著,特别是其中处于失业或休假待岗状态的家庭。就业保留计划的岗位保护部分几乎解释了其带来的全部福利增益,而计划的高慷慨程度仅发挥次要作用,且对总体净福利的影响并不明确。我们还讨论了就业保留计划具有价值的条件,并表明,在以下情况下,此类计划可能导致福利下降:补贴了过多本无风险的岗位;针对的是计划结束后必然流失、不具存续能力的岗位;以及在劳动力市场摩擦较低的经济体中实施。

Abstract

We evaluate the welfare effects of the temporary job retention schemes (JRS) implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in a DSGE model with incomplete insurance and heterogeneous agents calibrated to the euro area. JRS have large favorable welfare effects and benefit all households when they are well targeted at potentially viable jobs at risk of being lost. These gains are particularly strong for liquid-asset-poor households, especially for those that are also unemployed or on furlough. The job protection component of JRS explains almost all the welfare gains they deliver, while their high level of generosity plays a minor role and has ambiguous net aggregate welfare effects. We also discuss the conditions that make JRS valuable and show that they can cause a decrease in welfare when they subsidize too many safe jobs; when they are targeted at non-viable jobs that will inevitably be lost once schemes end; and when implemented in economies where labor market frictions are low.
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