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市政债务的“私有化”

The “Privatization” of municipal debt
Journal of Public Economics · 2024 · Ivan T. Ivanov、Tom Zimmermann

中文摘要

我们利用美联储的细粒度数据,研究地方政府依赖银行贷款的决定因素。规模较大、风险较高、依赖历史上较为稳定的收入来源,或支出相对于收入较高的政府,更有可能向银行借款。收入下降、债券市场准入减少,以及与财务顾问和承销商的关系,均能强烈预示对银行贷款依赖程度的提高。尽管银行贷款与债券的相似之处有限,但贷款为政府提供了市政债券市场无法提供的显著财务灵活性。频繁的贷款重新谈判和信用额度使用均对信用质量的变化高度敏感,从而使债务合约能够随政府基本面的变化而调整。规模最大的实体认为这种灵活性最为有用:截至2017年,收入最高五分位组中近45%的实体获得了银行贷款。

Abstract

We study the determinants of local governments’ reliance on bank loans using granular data from the Federal Reserve. Governments that are larger, riskier, rely on historically stable revenue sources, or have higher spending relative to revenues are more likely to borrow from banks. Declines in revenues, reductions in bond market access, and relationships with financial advisers and underwriters all strongly predict higher bank loan reliance. While resemblance between bank loans and bonds is limited, loans afford governments significant financial flexibility not otherwise available in the municipal bond market. The frequent loan renegotiation and credit line use are both highly responsive to changes in credit quality, thereby tailoring debt contracts to changes in government fundamentals. The largest entities find this flexibility most useful with nearly 45% of entities in the top revenue quintile obtaining a bank loan by 2017.
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