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最低税率的税收竞争效应:来自德国市镇的经验证据

Tax competition effects of a minimum tax rate: Empirical evidence from German municipalities
Journal of Public Economics · 2024 · Thiess Buettner、Maximilian Poehnlein

中文摘要

本文探讨了一项联邦法律的影响,该法律要求德国此前不受监管的市镇对企业应税利润设定最低税率。具体而言,我们考察了与“避税港市镇”在本地展开竞争的市镇所作出的税收政策反应;所谓“避税港市镇”,是指原先设定了较低税率、在某些情况下甚至设定零税率的市镇。本文根据各市镇与避税港市镇之间的距离,区分处理组市镇与非处理组市镇。结果表明,大多数市镇并未改变其税收政策。除避税港市镇外,只有高税率市镇作出了反应——它们降低了营业税税率,但税收收入并未下降。

Abstract

This paper explores the effects of a federal law that obligates previously unregulated municipalities in Germany to set a minimum tax rate on firms’ taxable profits. In particular, we examine the tax-policy response of municipalities that compete locally with “tax-haven municipalities”, i.e.municipalities that originally have set lower and, in some cases, even zero tax rates. The analysis distinguishes treated and not-treated municipalities based on their distance to a tax-haven. Our results show that the majority of municipalities do not change their tax policy. Apart from the tax-havens, only high-tax municipalities show a response – they reduce the business tax rate without experiencing a decline in tax revenues.
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