设定与评估价格下限的工具包

中文摘要

监管者常常设定价格下限，以保护生产者免受中间商涉嫌市场势力的损害。我们提出了一套工具包，用于预测、估计和解释价格下限对产出和福利分配的影响。我们将该工具包应用于哥伦比亚公路货运行业，利用旨在保护承运人免受中间商所付低运价影响的费率下限。我们发现，政策制定者本可预测价格下限对数量的影响：在费率下限具有约束力的线路和产品上，运输数量会减少。费率下限于2017年实施后使承运人受益，但使总福利减少了市场收入的12%。

Abstract

Regulators often impose price floors to protect producers from suspected market power by intermediaries. We present a toolkit for predicting, estimating, and explaining the effect of price floors on output and the distribution of welfare. We apply this toolkit to the Colombian road freight sector, taking advantage of rate floors that intended to protect carriers from low freight rates paid by intermediaries. We find that policymakers could have predicted the effect of price floors on quantities: a reduction in quantities for the routes and products for which rate floors were binding. After their implementation in 2017, rate floors benefited carriers but reduced total welfare by 12% of market revenue.