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西翼之内:作为竞赛的游说

Inside the West Wing: Lobbying as a contest
Journal of Public Economics · 2024 · Alastair Langtry

中文摘要

当政府作出许多不同的政策决策时,游说可以被视为政府与众多不同特殊利益集团之间的竞赛。政府以自身的政治资本对抗利益集团的游说。在这种情形下,我们发现,政府希望向某些利益集团“出售保护”——即以优惠待遇换取捐款。政府这样做是为了建立自己的政治资本“战备金”,从而改善其在与其他利益集团较量中的处境。政府会持续这样做,直至能够确定无疑地赢得其余所有竞赛。这与现有模型形成对比,后者通常认为游说是由信息问题或代理问题所驱动的。

Abstract

When a government makes many different policy decisions, lobbying can be viewed as a contest between the government and many different special interest groups. The government fights lobbying by interest groups with its own political capital. In this world, we find that a government wants to ‘sell protection’ – give favourable treatment in exchange for contributions – to certain interest groups. It does this in order to build its own ‘war chest’ of political capital, which improves its position in fights with other interest groups. And it does so until it wins all remaining contests with certainty. This stands in contrast to existing models that often view lobbying as driven by information or agency problems.
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