权力在握？政治结盟、政府组建与政府稳定性

中文摘要

我们运用断点回归设计和西班牙市政选举的大规模数据集，研究不同政府层级间的党派结盟如何影响联合政府的组建与政府稳定性。我们发现，结盟对政府组建和稳定性均具有正向影响。结盟提高了得票最多的政党任命市长的概率，并降低了政府在任期内被罢免的概率。结盟政党在下一次选举中也获得了可观的选举收益。我们表明，这些发现并非源于转移支付分配中对结盟政府的偏袒。

Abstract

We study how partisan alignment across levels of government affects coalition formation and government stability using a regression discontinuity design and a large dataset of Spanish municipal elections. We document a positive effect of alignment on both government formation and stability. Alignment increases the probability that the most-voted party appoints the mayor and decreases the probability that the government is unseated during the term. Aligned parties also obtain sizeable electoral gains in the next elections. We show that these findings are not the consequence of favoritism in the allocation of transfers towards aligned governments.