National Bureau of Economic Research · 2022 · Eliana Carranza、Aletheia Donald、Florian Grosset、Supreet Kaur
中文摘要
在富国和穷国的低收入社区中，亲属和社会网络内部的再分配转移都十分常见。这类安排可能扭曲劳动供给——起到一种削弱工作激励的“社会税”作用。我们记录到，从美国到科特迪瓦，各国低收入群体均报告面临与他人分享劳动所得的强大压力；此外，进行更多人际间转移的社会群体工作时间更少。通过一项实地实验，我们让科特迪瓦实行计件工资的工厂工人在9个月内使用限制提取的储蓄账户来隔离收入。相对于基线水平，工人只能存入新增的劳动所得，从而减轻收入效应对劳动供给的影响。提供私人账户使出勤率提高6.5%，劳动所得提高9.4%。这些处理效应集中于基线时报告承受更高再分配压力的工人。为了获得有关作用机制的进一步提示性证据，我们在一项补充实验中改变限制提取账户是私密的、还是为工人的社会网络所知。当账户私密时，使用率显著更高（60%对14%），由此使劳动所得提高8.8%。对外转移并未减少，表明再分配没有受损。非正式再分配的福利收益可能伴随一定代价，即抑制劳动供给和生产率。
Abstract
In low‐income communities in both rich and poor countries, redistributive transfers within kin and social networks are frequent. Such arrangements may distort labor supply—acting as a “social tax” that dampens the incentive to work. We document that across countries, from the United States to Côte d'Ivoire, low‐income groups report strong pressure to share earned income with others; in addition, social groups that undertake more interpersonal transfers work fewer hours. Using a field experiment, we enable piece‐rate factory workers in Côte d'Ivoire to shield income using blocked savings accounts over 9 months. Workers may only deposit earnings increases, relative to baseline, mitigating income effects on labor supply. Offering Private accounts raises work attendance by 6.5% and earnings by 9.4%. These treatment effects are concentrated among workers who report higher redistributive pressure at baseline. To obtain further suggestive evidence on mechanisms, in a supplementary experiment, we vary whether blocked accounts are private or known to the worker's network. When accounts are private, take‐up is substantively higher (60% vs. 14%), with a resultant 8.8% higher earnings. Outgoing transfers do not decline, indicating no loss in redistribution. The welfare benefits of informal redistribution may come at a cost, depressing labor supply and productivity.