National Bureau of Economic Research · 2020 · Nikita Melnikov、Carlos Schmidt-Padilla、María Micaela Sviatschi
中文摘要
我们研究犯罪组织的地域控制如何影响经济发展。我们利用萨尔瓦多的一项自然实验：这些犯罪组织的出现源于美国移民政策的一次外生转变，该转变导致帮派头目从美国被驱逐回萨尔瓦多。抵达后，帮派控制了许多城市地区，并重建了一套边界体系，以保护其领土不受外来者侵扰。运用空间断点回归设计，我们发现，帮派控制街区中的居民在物质福利、收入和教育程度上均低于仅相距50米、但居住在帮派领土之外的居民。在帮派到来之前，这些断点均不存在。这些结果背后的一个关键机制是，帮派限制了居民的流动性，通过阻止他们通勤至城市其他地区，影响了其劳动力市场选择。这些结果并非由较高的选择性迁移率、遭受勒索和暴力的差异化风险，或公共品供给差异所决定。
Abstract
We study how territorial control by criminal organizations affects economic development. We exploit a natural experiment in El Salvador, where the emergence of these criminal organizations was the consequence of an exogenous shift in American immigration policy that led to the deportation of gang leaders from the United States to El Salvador. Upon arrival, the gangs gained control over many urban areas and re-created a system of borders to protect their territory from outsiders. Using a spatial regression discontinuity design, we find that individuals in gangcontrolled neighborhoods have less material well-being, income, and education than individuals living only 50 meters away but outside of gang territory. None of these discontinuities existed before the arrival of the gangs. A key mechanism behind the results is that gangs restrict individuals' mobility, affecting their labor market options by preventing them from commuting to other parts of the city. The results are not determined by high rates of selective migration, differential exposure to extortion and violence, or differences in public goods provision.