American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2023 · Aurélie Ouss、Megan T. Stevenson
中文摘要
法院通常将低额现金保释作为一种经济激励，以确保获释被告出庭并避免犯罪。这可能给被告造成负担，而关于其有效性的经验证据却很少。我们利用一项由检察官推动的改革来检验此类激励机制能否实现其预期目的；该改革导致低额现金保释和审前监管大幅减少，但对审前羁押没有影响。我们没有发现任何证据表明，经济担保对未出庭或审前犯罪具有威慑作用。本文还对有关法律行为主体自由裁量权的文献作出了贡献，表明不具约束力的改革对监狱在押人数的影响可能有限。（JEL K41, K42）
Abstract
Courts routinely use low cash bail as a financial incentive to ensure released defendants appear in court and abstain from crime. This can create burdens for defendants with little empirical evidence on its efficacy. We exploit a prosecutor-driven reform that led to a sharp reduction in low cash bail and pretrial supervision, with no effect on pretrial detention, to test whether such incentive mechanisms succeed at their intended purpose. We find no evidence that financial collateral has a deterrent effect on failure to appear or pretrial crime. This paper also contributes to the literature on legal actor discretion, showing that nonbinding reforms may have limited impact on jail populations. (JEL K41, K42)