纪律处分能否减少警察不当行为？来自芝加哥平民指控的证据

中文摘要

改革倡导者呼吁加强对警察行为的监督，其中一项措施是进一步发挥平民投诉的作用。然而，也有人反驳称，加强监督可能会抑制有效的警务工作。我们评估了警员对不当行为行政裁定的反应。利用芝加哥的数据，我们发现有力证据表明，一项获认定成立的指控会减少该警员未来的不当行为。我们未发现任何证据表明，这一效应是由限制履职能力（如被安排从事案头工作）或警员消极履职所驱动。我们认为，研究结果与警员行为改善最为一致，而这种改善部分源于监督以及警员对晋升、薪资和理想岗位安排的关注。（JEL H76、J45、K42、M54）

Abstract

Reformers are calling for greater oversight of police behavior, in part through enhanced use of civilian complaints. However, others counter that greater oversight could chill effective policing. We assess police officer response to administrative determinations of misconduct. Using Chicago data, we find strong evidence that a sustained allegation reduces that officer’s future misconduct. We find no evidence that this effect is driven by incapacitation, such as assignment to desk duty, or by officer disengagement. We conclude that our findings are most consistent with improved officer conduct, in part from oversight and officer concerns over promotion, salary, and desirable assignments. (JEL H76, J45, K42, M54)