中文摘要
西班牙的监护征赋制是一种持续了三个世纪的殖民强制劳动制度，它导致许多原住民死亡，并促使其他人逃亡、转入游牧状态。其长期影响是什么？我们数字化了自16世纪中叶以来的大量历史数据，在市镇层面推算前西班牙时期的人口，并利用详细的地形特征重建西班牙征服者穿越哥伦比亚的路线，以计算其最低成本路径。我们发现，与1560年没有监护征赋制的哥伦比亚市镇相比，当时设有监护征赋制的市镇如今在发展的多个维度上表现更好：更高的市镇人均GDP、税收收入和受教育程度；更低的婴儿死亡率、贫困率和未满足基本需求；更大的人口规模；以及更优的财政绩效和官僚行政效率，但同时也存在更高的不平等程度。原因何在？利用1794年关于地方制度、人口和种族构成的数据进行的中介分析表明，监护征赋制主要通过帮助构建地方国家来影响发展。深入的历史证据具体揭示了监护征赋制领主如何在其定居地较早建立地方制度。缺乏监护征赋制的地方也缺乏地方国家，而且这种状况往往持续数百年。地方制度以无疑符合监护征赋制领主利益的方式动员公共投资，但随着时间推移，也推动了更大程度的经济和人类发展。
Abstract
Abstract The Spanish encomienda, a colonial forced-labour institution that lasted three centuries, killed many indigenous people and caused others to flee into nomadism. What were its long-term effects? We digitise a great deal of historical data from the mid-1500s onwards, impute pre-Hispanic populations at the municipal level and reconstruct the Spanish conquerors’ route through Colombia using detailed topographical features to calculate their least-cost path. We show that Colombian municipalities with encomiendas in 1560 enjoy better outcomes today across multiple dimensions of development than those without: higher municipal GDP per capita, tax receipts and educational attainment; lower infant mortality, poverty and unsatisfied basic needs; larger populations; and superior fiscal performance and bureaucratic efficiency, but also higher inequality. Why? Mediation analysis using data on local institutions, populations and racial composition in 1794 shows that encomiendas affected development primarily by helping build the local state. Deep historical evidence fleshes out how encomenderos founded local institutions early on in the places they settled. Places lacking encomiendas also lacked local states, often for centuries. Local institutions mobilised public investment in ways that doubtless suited encomenderos, but, over time, spurred greater economic and human development.