Review of Economic Studies · 2023 · Jason Allen、Robert Clark、Brent Hickman、Eric Richert
中文摘要
美国联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）采用评分拍卖处置资不抵债的银行。尽管投标人知道评分规则的结构，但他们不确定FDIC如何权衡不同的投标组成部分。评分规则的不确定性促使投标人针对同一家问题银行提交多份投标。为了评估不确定性和多重投标对FDIC成本的影响，我们提出了一种方法，用于分析当拍卖方的评分权重对投标人未知时的多维投标问题。我们估计了金融危机期间问题银行资产的私人估值，并计算了不存在评分不确定性情况下的反事实结果。我们的研究结果表明，FDIC的处置成本将大幅降低，降幅介于29.8%（82亿美元）至44.6%（123亿美元）之间。由于FDIC的处置成本或是通过向银行征收特别费用来弥补，或是通过美国财政部的贷款来弥补，这些成本节约可以减少政策驱动的银行业扭曲。我们的分析还为组合拍卖中的最优投标组合选择提供了新的见解。
Abstract
Abstract The FDIC resolves insolvent banks with scoring auctions. Although the structure of the scoring rule is known to bidders, they are uncertain about how the FDIC trades off different bid components. Scoring-rule uncertainty motivates bidders to submit multiple bids for the same failed bank. To evaluate the effects of uncertainty and multiple bidding for FDIC costs, we develop a methodology for analysing multidimensional bidding when the auctioneer’s scoring weights are unknown to bidders. We estimate private valuations for failed-bank assets during the great financial crisis and compute counterfactuals in the absence of scoring uncertainty. Our findings imply a substantial reduction in FDIC resolution costs of between 29.8% ($8.2 billion) and 44.6% ($12.3 billion). These savings can reduce policy-driven banking-sector distortions, since FDIC resolution costs are covered either through special levies on banks or through loans from the US Treasury. Our analyses also shed new light on optimal bid portfolio choice in combinatorial auctions.