Journal of Public Economics · 2026 · Linn Hjalmarsson、Christian P.R. Schmid、Nicolas Schreiner
中文摘要
本文考察信息摩擦与注意力不足在医疗保健市场中的作用。我们分析了直接向患者提供针对性信息，对其在原研药与仿制药之间选择的影响。利用瑞士一家健康保险公司寄出的6万封信息函的行政数据，并借助信函寄送时间的准随机性，我们发现，告知患者存在更便宜的替代药品，使其采用仿制药替代的可能性提高至近四倍。关键的是，这一效应并不显著取决于患者的共付状态。研究结果凸显了仅依靠经济激励的医疗保健政策的局限：当患者缺乏关于可选方案的充分信息时，此类政策的作用有限。• 研究了向原研药购买者寄送的6万封定向信函，这些信函告知其仿制药的存在。• 利用准随机的邮寄延迟识别该信息的因果效应。• 相对于10%的基准水平，信函使仿制药替代率提高至近四倍。• 即使没有经济激励，患者信息也会对其决策产生较大影响。
Abstract
This paper examines the role of information frictions and inattention in the market for health care. We analyze the impact of providing targeted information directly to patients on their choice between brand-name and generic drugs. Using administrative data on 60,000 informational letters sent by a Swiss health insurer, and exploiting the quasi-randomized timing of the dispatch, we find that informing patients of cheaper alternatives leads to an almost fourfold increase in the likelihood of generic substitution. Crucially, this effect does not substantially depend on the patient’s co-payment status. Our results highlight the limits of healthcare policies relying solely on financial incentives when patients lack sufficient information regarding their choices. • Study 60,000 targeted letters informing brand buyers about the existence of generics. • Quasi-random mailing delays identify the causal effect of this information. • Letters quadruple generic substitution relative to a 10% baseline. • Patient information has a large impact on decisions even without financial incentives.