Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private Versus Political Intermediaries
Journal of the European Economic Association · 2024 · Pushkar Maitra、Sandip Mitra、Dilip Mookherjee、Sujata Visaria
中文摘要
我们在印度开展了一项田野实验，比较将小农户中的小额信贷客户遴选工作委托给当地中介的两种方式：由私人贸易商负责（TRAIL），或由地方政府任命人员负责（GRAIL）。两种方案中入选的受益者获得并偿还贷款的可能性相同，借款额和农业产出也均出现了相近幅度的增长。然而，只有在TRAIL方案中，农场利润显著增加，单位生产成本显著下降。尽管有一些证据表明，TRAIL在依据能力和土地持有规模进行遴选方面更为出色，但研究结果主要源于：在能力或土地持有规模相近的受处理农户中，TRAIL受处理农户的单位生产成本降幅大于GRAIL受处理农户。我们构建并检验了一个模型：TRAIL代理人在农业供应链中充当中间商，这一角色使其既有能力也有动力向受处理农户提供经营建议，从而帮助他们降低单位成本。
Abstract
Abstract We conduct a field experiment in India comparing two ways of delegating selection of microcredit clients among smallholder farmers to local intermediaries: a private trader (TRAIL), versus a local–government appointee (GRAIL). Selected beneficiaries in both schemes were equally likely to take up and repay loans, and experienced similar increases in borrowing and farm output. However farm profits increased and unit costs of production decreased significantly only in TRAIL. While there is some evidence of superior selection by ability and landholding in TRAIL, the results are mainly driven by greater reduction of unit production costs for TRAIL treated farmers than GRAIL treated farmers of similar ability or landholding. We develop and test a model where the TRAIL agents’ role as middlemen in the agricultural supply chain enabled and motivated them to offer treated farmers business advice, which helped them lower unit costs.