Review of Economic Studies · 2025 · [{"name": "Kyle Dempsey", "affiliation": ["The Ohio State University"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 我在一个模型中定量分析了提高资本要求的宏观经济影响; 在该模型中, 异质性企业可以选择中介融资或直接融资。异质性银行既与其他银行竞争, 也与债券市场竞争, 它们以受保存款和成本高昂的权益 (受最低资本资产比约束) 为贷款融资, 并对借款人进行监督。我发现, 更严格的资本要求在减少代价高昂的银行倒闭的同时, 对关键宏观经济总量的影响很小; 将资本要求提高到当前水平之上可以改善福利。促成这些结果的主要有三种力量。第一, 尽管在更严格的资本要求下、给定净值水平时银行会削减贷款供给, 但在均衡中银行净值会上升, 从而减弱这一效应。第二, 来自非银行部门的激烈竞争约束了银行对更严格监管的贷款反应。第三, 公司企业的替代行为抵消了与银行贷款供给收紧相关的债务融资下降中的大部分。作为推论, 与更严格资本要求相关的温和成本几乎全部集中于依赖银行的非公司部门。
Abstract
Abstract I quantitatively analyse the macroeconomic impacts of raising capital requirements in a model in which heterogeneous firms may choose either intermediated or direct finance. Heterogeneous banks compete with other banks and the bond market, fund loans with insured deposits and costly equity (subject to a minimum capital-to-asset ratio), and monitor borrowers. I find that tighter capital requirements reduce costly bank failures while having only small effects on key macroeconomic aggregates, and that raising capital requirements above current levels can be welfare-improving. Three main forces give rise to these results. First, even though banks cut loan supply for a given level of net worth under a tighter capital requirement, in equilibrium banks’ net worth rises to dampen this effect. Second, intense competition from the non-bank sector disciplines banks’ lending responses to tighter regulation. Third, substitution by corporate firms offsets much of the decline in debt financing associated with tighter bank loan supply. As a corollary, almost all of the modest costs associated with tighter capital requirements are concentrated within the bank-dependent non-corporate sector.