American Economic Review · 2023 · S. Nageeb Ali、B. Douglas Bernheim、Alexander W. Bloedel、Silvia Console Battilana
中文摘要
我们对立法决策进行建模，其中议程设定者可以序贯提出政策，根据先前投票后形成的现状调整每一项提案。投票者是老练的，且议程设定者无法对未来的提案做出承诺。然而，无论初始默认政策如何，议程设定者在每个均衡中都能获得她最偏好的结果。我们结果的核心是偏好的一个新条件——可操纵性，该条件在丰富的政策空间中成立，包括空间设定与分配问题。因此，我们的发现表明，尽管投票者老练且议程设定者缺乏承诺力，议程设定者实际上是一个独裁者。(JEL D71, D72, D78)
Abstract
We model legislative decision-making with an agenda setter who can propose policies sequentially, tailoring each proposal to the status quo that prevails after prior votes. Voters are sophisticated, and the agenda setter cannot commit to future proposals. Nevertheless, the agenda setter obtains her favorite outcome in every equilibrium regardless of the initial default policy. Central to our results is a new condition on preferences, manipulability, that holds in rich policy spaces, including spatial settings and distribution problems. Our findings therefore establish that, despite the sophistication of voters and the absence of commitment power, the agenda setter is effectively a dictator. (JEL D71, D72, D78)