潜在收益期限变化的微观与宏观效应

Review of Economic Studies · 2025 · [{"name": "Jonas Jessen", "affiliation": ["WZB Berlin Social Science Center"]}, {"name": "Robin Jessen", "affiliation": ["IZA - Institute of Labor Economics"]}, {"name": "Ewa Gałecka‐Burdziak", "affiliation": ["SGH Warsaw School of Economics"]}, {"name": "Marek Góra", "affiliation": ["SGH Warsaw School of Economics"]}, {"name": "Jochen Kluve", "affiliation": ["Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin"]}]

中文摘要

摘要我们量化了失业保险中潜在给付期限（PBD）变化的微观与宏观效应。在波兰, 若上一年度县级失业率超过全国平均水平的150%, 则新失业者的PBD为12个月, 否则为6个月。我们利用这一临界值, 基于包含2005年至2019年全部失业者的登记数据进行断点回归估计。对于PBD直接受政策规则影响的群体, 即50岁以下的给付领取者, PBD从6个月提高到12个月使失业上升13%。分解分析显示, 在PBD提高后的第12个月, 失业上升中仅有一半源于对搜寻努力的影响（微观效应）, 另一半则源于失业流入的增加。包含均衡效应在内的失业总效应, 完全由直接受政策变化影响的劳动者的失业增加所解释。对于PBD未发生变化的两个不同失业群体, 我们没有发现溢出效应的证据, 也没有发现对劳动力市场紧张程度指标的影响。

Abstract

Abstract We quantify micro and macro effects of changes in the potential benefit duration (PBD) in unemployment insurance. In Poland, the PBD is 12 months for the newly unemployed if the previous year’s county unemployment rate is more than 150% of the national average, and 6 months otherwise. We exploit this cut-off using regression discontinuity estimates on registry data containing the universe of unemployed from 2005 to 2019. For those whose PBD is directly affected by the policy rule, benefit recipients younger than 50, a PBD increase from 6 to 12 months leads to 13% higher unemployment. A decomposition analysis reveals that 12 months after an increase in the PBD, only half of the increase in unemployment is due to the effect on search effort (the micro effect) while the other half is due to increased inflows into unemployment. The total effect on unemployment, which includes equilibrium effects, is entirely explained by the increase in unemployment of workers directly affected by the policy change. We find no evidence of spill-overs on two distinct groups of unemployed whose PBD is unchanged and no effect on measures of labour market tightness.