中文摘要
本文提出一个具有非对称信息和持续议程设置者的两期集体谈判模型。投票者掌握有关其政策偏好的私人信息。只有在初始提案未获通过时，议程设置者才有机会对其进行修改并发起再次投票。如果修订后的提案未获通过，则实施现状政策。我们证明，对于任意数量的投票者和任意 q 规则，都存在信息性均衡：第一期投票使投票者能够传递其政策偏好的信号，而议程设置者会在反对票更多时提出更具妥协性的方案。我们运用该模型识别能够改善个人福利和政策推进方面政治结果的重要因素。具体而言，我们表明，议程设置者获得重新考虑的机会能够改善其福利，并缓解政策僵局（后者被定义为政策不发生变化的结果）。同时，只要投票规则对议程设置者的约束足够强，投票所揭示的信息也能使投票者受益。此外，投票者较低的策略成熟度不仅能够使其自身和议程设置者实现进一步的帕累托改进，还能在更大程度上避免政策僵局。
Abstract
We present a two-period collective bargaining model with asymmetric information and a persistent agenda setter. Voters have private information about their policy preferences. Only upon the failure of the initial proposal does the setter have a chance to revise it and call for a re-vote. The status quo gets implemented if the revised proposal fails. We establish the existence of an informative equilibrium for any number of voters and any q -rule, where the first-period voting enables the voters to signal their policy preferences and the setter makes a more compromising proposal upon more negative votes. We apply the model to identify important sources that improve political outcomes regarding individuals’ welfare and policy progress. Specifically, we show that the setter’s reconsideration opportunity improves her welfare and alleviates policy gridlock, which is defined as the outcome of no policy change. Meanwhile, the information revealed through voting can also benefit the voters, provided that the setter is sufficiently constrained by the voting rule. In addition, voters’ less sophistication can not only make a further Pareto improvement for themselves and the setter but can also avoid policy gridlock to a larger extent.