跨州策略性投票

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2026 · [{"name": "Gordon B. Dahl", "affiliation": ["Center for Economic and Policy Research"]}, {"name": "Joseph Engelberg", "affiliation": ["UC San Diego Health System"]}, {"name": "Runjing Lu", "affiliation": ["University of Toronto"]}, {"name": "William Mullins", "affiliation": ["UC San Diego Health System"]}]

中文摘要

我们估计, 2020 年有 3.1% 的美国选民, 即 610 万人, 在两个州登记投票, 从而使他们有可能选择在何处投票。双重登记者集中于最富裕的邮政编码地区, 且对激励与成本均有反应: 他们不成比例地选择在摇摆州 (激励更高) 以及自动寄送邮寄选票的州 (成本更低) 投票。我们将这一行为称为「跨州策略性投票」(Cross-State Strategic Voting)。已有研究记录了关于「投票给谁」的策略性激励, 而本文是首篇考察关于「在何处投票」的策略性激励的研究。(JEL D63, D72, K16)

Abstract

We estimate that 3.1 percent of US voters, or 6.1 million individuals, were registered to vote in two states in 2020, opening up the possibility for them to choose where to vote. Double registrants are concentrated in the wealthiest zip codes and respond to both incentives and costs, disproportionately choosing to vote in swing states (higher incentive) and states that automatically send out mail-in ballots (lower cost). We call this behavior Cross-State Strategic Voting. While others have documented strategic incentives on who to vote for, this paper is the first to consider strategic incentives on where to vote. (JEL D63, D72, K16)