中文摘要
监管者经常施加规则以约束市场参与者的行为。我们将保险市场中监管政策的设计视为一个委托问题来研究。监管者限制知情企业获准提供的合同菜单，企业向每位消费者提供一份获准的菜单，消费者从所提供的菜单中选择合同。如果消费者类型和企业信号能够按照反映保障需求的方式排序，监管者便可通过强制企业在每份菜单中提供指定的额外选项来利用企业的信息。若干扩展分析说明了本文结果的实际应用。（JEL D21, D43, D82, D86, G22, G28, L51）
Abstract
Regulators often impose rules that constrain the behavior of market participants. We study the design of regulatory policy in an insurance market as a delegation problem. A regulator restricts the menus of contracts an informed firm is permitted to offer, the firm offers a permitted menu to each consumer, and consumers choose contracts from offered menus. If consumer types and firm signals are ordered in a way that reflects coverage need, the regulator can leverage the firm’s information by forcing the firm to offer specified additional options on each menu. Several extensions illustrate the practical application of our results. (JEL D21, D43, D82, D86, G22, G28, L51)