推荐在劳动力市场流动性、不平等和无效率中的作用
The Role of Referrals in Immobility, Inequality, and Inefficiency in Labor Markets
Journal of Labor Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "Lukas Bolte", "affiliation": ["Stanford University"]}, {"name": "Nicole Immorlica", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Matthew O. Jackson", "affiliation": ["Stanford University"]}]
中文摘要
我们研究劳动力市场高度依赖推荐所带来的后果。推荐为劳动者带来更多被雇用的机会, 这会促成更好的匹配并提高生产率, 但同时也使那些与在职劳动者缺乏联系或联系很少的求职者处于不利地位, 从而加剧不平等。与同质性相结合, 推荐还会导致流动性不足。我们识别出在何种条件下, 更均等地分配推荐能够降低不平等, 并改善未来的生产率与流动性。我们利用该模型考察平权行动和算法公平等政策的短期与长期福利影响。
Abstract
We study the consequences of job markets' heavy reliance on referrals. Referrals lead to more opportunities for workers to be hired, which lead to better matches and increased productivity but also disadvantage job seekers with few or no connections to employed workers, increasing inequality. Coupled with homophily, referrals also lead to immobility. We identify conditions under which distributing referrals more evenly reduces inequality and improves future productivity and mobility. We use the model to examine the short- and long-run welfare impacts of policies such as affirmative action and algorithmic fairness.