中文摘要
不同职业的体力劳动强度差异很大,相应地,晚年工作能力丧失风险、退休模式以及社会保障残疾保险(SSDI)申请也存在诸多差异。SSDI是一项全国性计划,为残疾导致的工作生产率冲击提供保险,目前在美国约有900万名受益人。鉴于该计划覆盖广泛且不同职业间的使用程度差异显著,本文旨在衡量SSDI计划对广大人群的价值,以及该计划对职业这一重大选择的影响程度。本文使用健康与退休研究和O*NET的数据,估计了一个涵盖职业选择、工作、储蓄和老年残疾的生命周期均衡模型,并发现,将职业和偏好异质性纳入分析是理解工作与SSDI申请行为不可或缺的部分。尽管SSDI的覆盖几乎具有普遍性,且劳动者缴纳的保费统一,但估计结果表明,该计划的价值差异很大:取决于个人偏好和职业选择,其价值相当于劳动收入的2.1%至14.5%;不过,该计划对所有群体均能改善福利。本文还发现,SSDI在老年劳动者的职业选择中发挥着重要作用,其提供的保险价值使老年阶段选择高体力强度蓝领职业的人数增加了10%以上。然而,这一总体效应掩盖了风险厌恶程度较低者更倾向于选择蓝领工作这一潜在的自我选择机制;若不加以考虑,就会高估SSDI计划对行为的影响。一项旨在消除统一SSDI税率所造成扭曲的反事实实验表明,即使雇主不再为残疾劳动者提供任何额外便利,按职业设定不同税率也会减少总体工作能力丧失年数。
Abstract
Occupations vary greatly in physical intensity, and there are, correspondingly, many differences in later-life work disability risk, retirement patterns, and applications for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)—a national program that insures shocks to work productivity due to disability, with about nine million current beneficiaries in the U.S. In light of its widespread coverage and large differences in utilization across occupations, this paper aims to measure the value of the SSDI program across a broad population and the extent to which it influences the major choice of occupation. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study and O*NET, I estimate a life-cycle equilibrium model of occupational choice, work, savings, and disability at older ages, and find that incorporating occupations and preference heterogeneity is an integral part of understanding work and SSDI application behavior. While SSDI coverage is nearly universal and the premiums from workers are uniform, estimates suggest that the value of the program varies greatly, from being worth 2.1 to 14.5 percent of earned income—depending on preferences and choice of occupation—though for all groups it is welfare improving. I also find that SSDI plays an important role in the choice of occupation for older workers, providing an insurance value that results in over ten percent more people choosing physically intense, blue-collar occupations at older ages. This overall effect, however, masks the underlying selection of less risk-averse individuals into blue-collar jobs, which, if not accounted for, would lead to overstating the effects of the SSDI program on behavior. A counterfactual experiment aimed at eliminating the distortion created by uniform SSDI tax rates shows that—even without any additional employer accommodation of disabled workers—occupation-specific tax rates lead to fewer aggregate work-disabled years.