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电力可靠性的经济学

The Economics of Electricity Reliability
Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2023 · Severin Borenstein、James Bushnell、Erin T. Mansur

中文摘要

电网的物理特性要求注入电网的供电量始终与用电量保持平衡。如果无法维持这种平衡,级联停电很可能会中断电网中所有消费者的电力供应。过去,纵向一体化的垄断性公用事业企业会确保供电充足,以满足需求并维持电网稳定;但随着发电环节放松管制,保障充足供电已变得复杂得多。电力输配的独特特征意味着,供电短缺可能在市场参与者之间产生巨大的潜在外部性。本文讨论在市场中存在多个发电商和零售商的情况下,美国电力市场为避免此类破坏稳定的供电短缺而建立的制度。尽管许多市场依赖于对供应商备用容量的标准化要求,但我们得出结论,近期的技术进步可能会推动未来朝着一种更大程度依赖经济激励机制的体系演进。

Abstract

The physics of an electrical grid requires that the supply injected into the grid is always in balance with the quantity consumed. If that balance is not maintained, cascading outages are likely to disrupt supply to all consumers on the grid. In the past, vertically integrated monopoly utilities have ensured that supply is adequate to meet demand and maintain grid stability, but with deregulation of generation, assuring adequate supply has become much more complex. The unique characteristics of electricity distribution means that there are immense potential externalities among market participants from supply shortfalls. In this paper, we discuss the institutions that US electricity markets have developed to avoid such destabilizing supply shortfalls when there are multiple generators and retailers in the market. Though many of the markets rely on standardized requirements for supplier reserves, we conclude that recent technological progress may steer future evolution towards a system that relies to a greater extent on economic incentives.
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